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SCHOOL POLICY LIMITING EXCUSED RELIGIOUS ABSENCES VIOLATES
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Church of God v. Amarillo Independent School District, 511 F. Supp.
613 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
In Church of God v. Amarillo Independent School District I the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas confirmed the
federal courts' modern commitment to religious liberty and continuing
enforcement of the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 2
Plaintiffs, the Worldwide Church of God and twenty-four school age
church members, brought suit3 to enjoin enforcement of a school dis-
trict policy that allowed only two excused absences for religious holi-
days in each school year.4 Plaintiffs claimed that this policy violated
their right to free exercise of religion guaranteed by the first and four-
teenth amendments.5
1. 511 F. Supp. 613 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
2. Id. at 618. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); Robinson v. Price, 615 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1980); Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270 (C.D.
I11. 1979); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). See generally
Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973
DUKE L. J. 1217; Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEo. L.J. 1115 (1973).
3. Plaintiffs brought suit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1343(3) (1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Supp. IV 1980). The latter provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980).
4. The school district's policy, enacted on March 5, 1979, provided: "Excused absences
shall be granted to students for a maximum of 2 days for religious holidays in each school year."
511 F. Supp. at 615. In addition, the policy provided that students with excused absences could
make up missed work and receive a grade. Students with unexcused absences, however, received
a grade of zero for the work missed. Id. at 614-15.
Prior to the enactment of this policy, the principal, in his discretion, would determine whether
an absence was excused. The criteria for evaluating an absence included "to what degree was
choice a factor in the absence." Id. at 614. Under the policy, the principal regularly gave plain-
tiffs excused absences for their religious activities. Id.
5. See note 12 infra. The plaintiffs also contended that the policy violated the equal protec-
tion and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Plaintiffs claimed that the policy dis-
criminated against them because of their religious beliefs and by presuming that they were absent
without good reason. 511 F. Supp. at 615. Having found for the plaintiffs on free exercise
grounds, the district court did not need to address these additional claims. Id. at 618.
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The Church of God required that all Church members, on penalty of
loss of membership in good standing, observe seven annual holy days
and a seven day Feast of Tabernacles.6 The student plaintiffs therefore
missed ten school days every year. The school district's policy required
that the students receive a grade of zero for each unexcused absence.7
The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
and held: A school district's policy limiting excused religious absences
and requiring a grade of zero for every unexcused absence violates the
free exercise clause of the first amendment.8
The first amendment reflects the traditional American commitment
to two conflicting9 values: religious liberty'0 and separation of church
and state." The religion clauses prohibit legislation that advances or
inhibits the establishment of religion or interferes with the free exercise
6. Article 13 of the Fundamentals ofBelief of the Church of God states that "the seven
annual holy days as given to Israel by God through Moses, kept by Christ, the Apostle Paul, and
the New Testament Church, as evidenced by the books of Acts and Corinthians, are to be kept
today." Plaintiffs' Initial Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, 11, Church of
God v. Amarillo Independent School Dist., 511 F. Supp. 613 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Church of God
members are requireJ to refrain from all secular activity on designated holy days. 511 F. Supp. at
614.
7. 511 F. Supp. at 613-15.
8. Id. at 618.
9. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-72 (1970) (absolute prohibitions of the reli-
gion clauses have limited meaning as each clause, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to
clash with the other); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 463 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) (no bright-line distinction between establishment and free exercise questions); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1947) (religion clauses are interrelated and complementary);
Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States .4 Turning Point?, 1966 WIs. L. REv. 217, 267-
68, 289-96 (if religious exemptions do not automatically violate establishment limitations, it re-
mains unclear at what point they are required by the free exercise clause); Giannella, Religious
Liberty, Nonestablishment andDoctrinalDevelopment: Part I. The Nonestablishment PrincFple, 81
HARV. L. REV. 513, 516-22, 526-28 (1968) (a formidable task for the courts to strike a balance that
achieves political equality without undermining the value of voluntarism). See also L. PFEFFER,
CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 122 (1953): "Nothing in American constitutional history...
justifies an apportionment of values between disestablishment and freedom ... . The struggle
for religious liberty and/or disestablishment were parts of the same single evolutionary process
that culminated in the First Amendment."
10. See S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 2 (1902); R.
MILLER & R. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATES AND THE
SUPREME COURT 1-8 (1977); Freeman, A Remonstrancefor Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806
(1958); Summers, The Sources and Limits of Religious Freedom, 41 ILL. L. REV. 53 (1946).
11. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 162-64 (1878); R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS, supra note 10, at 3-6. See generally C. ANTIEAU,
A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT (1964); M. HOWE, THE
GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965).
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of religion.' 2 Excessive governmental accommodation of religion,
however, can lower the "wall of separation"' 3 between church and
state, forcing the courts to resolve conflicts between the clauses.' 4 Early
cases held that although laws could not interfere with religious beliefs,
they could interfere with religious actions.' 5 In the 1940s the Supreme
Court, primarily on first amendment free speech, press, and assembly
grounds, nearly eliminated the belief-action distinction. 16 The Court
12. The religion clauses state that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 3 10 U.S. 296 (1940), the Supreme Court held the guarantee of free
exercise of religion binding upon the states. In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the
Supreme Court applied the establishment clause to the states.
13. "I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which
declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and
state." T. JEFFERSON, 8 JEFF. WORKS 113, quotedin Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878). See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
14. See, e.g.. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (statute barring clergymen from holding
public office held to violate right to free exercise of religion despite establishment clause claim that
if he were elected, clergyman would promote the interests of one sect); Commission for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (New York state financial aid program
designed to promote the free exercise of religion by providing for maintenance services and tuition
reimbursement at religious elementary and secondary schools violates establishment clause); Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (property tax exemptions for religious organizations held to
create insignificant state involvement with religion and to help to guarantee the free exercise of all
forms of religion); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) ("released time" program in public
schools permitting children's release during school hours for religious instruction held neither to
aid religion nor to coerce children to take religious instruction).
15. See, e.g.. Romney v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 45-50 (1890) (congressional act repealing
the incorporation of the Mormon Church because of its unlawful promotion and practice of po-
lygamy upheld); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1890) (conviction of Mormon who vio-
lated Idaho statute requiring as prerequisite to voter registration an oath declaring that the voter
did not practice the crime of polygamy upheld); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878)
(conviction under state polygamy law of Mormon who claimed that the practice of polygamy was
his religious duty upheld). See also In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (Illinois bar admission
requirement that applicants indicate willingness to serve in the state militia in case of war upheld
against applicant whose religious beliefs prevented him from participating in violent activities);
Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (state university policy requiring
male students to take military science course upheld against student who, for religious and consci-
entious reasons, objected to taking the course).
16. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (compulsory flag
salute in public schools violated the spirit of the first amendment rights of free speech, press,
assembly, and worship); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (municipal ordi-
nance prohibiting door-to-door distribution of religious circulars held invalid as violative of rights
to free speech and press); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108, 114 (1943) (license tax on
distributors of religious literature violated first amendment freedoms of speech, press, and reli-
gion); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414 (1943) (ordinance prohibiting distribution of handbills,
as applied to Jehovah's Witness, violated freedoms of press and religion); Cantwell v. Connecti-
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subsequently fashioned a new heightened degree of protection for free
exercise of religion from these first amendment guarantees.' 7
In Cantwell v. Connecticut'8 a state statute conditioned lawful distri-
bution of religious literature and solicitation of contributions upon pro-
curement of a permit from a state official. The Supreme Court held
that the statute violated the applicants' rights to free speech and free
exercise of religion because it required the official to determine whether
the applicants' cause was religious.' 9 The Court stated that regulation
of religious activity designed to achieve valid legislative goals is lawful
only if it does not "unduly infringe" the right to free exercise of reli-
gion.20 Although the Court expanded the scope of free exercise protec-
tion, it continued to limit religious activities if they threatened public
safety, peace, or order.2'
cut, 3 10 U.S. 296, 307-11 (1940) (state statute conditioning lawful distribution of religious litera-
ture upon issuance of a permit by an official who decided whether the cause was religious violated
rights of free speech and religious liberty); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160-65 (1939)
(municipal ordinance prohibiting door-to-door distribution of circulars and solicitation of contri-
butions, as applied to Jehovah's Witness canvassing in the name of religion, violated rights to free
speech and press); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (city ordinance prohibiting distribu-
tion of literature without a permit, as applied to an individual distributing religious pamphlets,
violated freedom of press).
17. Pfeffer, supra note 2, at 1126.
18. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
19. Id. at 307.
20. "[A] state may by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the times, the
places and the manner of soliciting upon its streets. . . and may in other respects safeguard the
peace, good order and comfort of the community, without unconstitutionally invading the liberties
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 304.
21. "The [First] Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act.
The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society." Id. at 303-04. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603
(1961) ("legislative power. . . may reach people's actions when they are found to be in violation
of important social duties or subversive of good order"); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14,
18-19 (1946) (convictions of Mormons under the Mann Act upheld because the practice of polyg-
amy is barbarous, promiscuous, and immoral in the law); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945) (legislation can restrict first amendment liberties only if they present a "clear and present
danger" to the public interest); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-69 (1944) (state statute
prohibiting minors from distributing literature on the public streets upheld against Jehovah's Wit-
ness as a legitimate exercise of the state's broad power to control the conduct of children); Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905) (compulsory vaccination law upheld as a
legitimate exercise of the right of a community to protect itself); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 165 (1878) (the practice of polygamy is historically so odious to society that "it is impos-
sible to believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to prohibit
legislation in respect to this most important feature of social life").
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In Braunfeld v. Brown22 the Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute
prohibiting retail businesses from operating on Sunday. Petitioner was
an Orthodox Jewish merchant whose religion compelled him to close
his business on Saturday, the Sabbath day of his faith.z3 Petitioner
contended that the law violated his right to free exercise of religion by
forcing him to close a second day every week, thus placing him in a
precarious economic position.24
The Court fashioned a "direct-indirect burden" analysis to deter-
mine the constitutionality of government actions that interfere with re-
ligious practice.2 5 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, held
that legislation that does not outlaw the religious activity imposes only
an indirect, and thus constitutional, burden on the right to free exercise
of religion.26
The Court qualified its holding by stating that a law that indirectly
burdens the exercise of religion is unconstitutional if it effectively pre-
vents religious observance or discriminates among religions.27 The
Court found that the Sunday closing law served the state's secular in-
terest in maintaining a general day of rest and tranquility28 and thus
only indirectly burdened Braunfeld's religious activity.29
Two years later, in Sherbert v. Verner,3" the Court further expanded
the protection of the free exercise clause. The Court held that legisla-
tion burdening the free exercise of religion was permissible31 only when
enacted pursuant to a "compelling state interest"'32 which the state
22. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). Braunfeld v. Brown was decided with three companion cases: Gal-
lagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); McGowan v. Two Guys from Harrison-
Allentown, Inc., 366 U.S. 582 (1961); and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
23. 366 U.S. at 601.
24. Id. Petitioner specifically alleged that the law would force him to close his business alto-
gether. Id.
25. Id. at 606-07.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 607. The Court's judgment is reminiscent of the now discredited substantive due
process analysis in the area of economic regulation. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537
(1934) ("[i]f the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose,
and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied"). See
generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 502 (10th ed. 1980).
28. 366 U.S. at 607-09.
29. Id. at 605.
30. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
31. Id. at 406-07.
32. Id. at 406.
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could not have addressed through less restrictive means.33 In Sherbert
the appellant, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, was
discharged by her employer because she refused to work on Saturday,
her Sabbath.34 The Supreme Court held that the state's denial of un-
employment compensation benefits because appellant refused to accept
available employment requiring Saturday work violated her right to
free exercise of religion.3- The Court found that the eligibility require-
ments for compensation forced the employee to make an unjust choice
between following the precepts of her religion and keeping a job.36 The
Court found no compelling state interest to justify that burden.37
Current free exercise doctrine relies primarily on Wisconsin v.
Yoder,3 8 in which the Supreme Court refined the Braunfeld and Sher-
bert criteria and established a three-part balancing test.39 First, a court
must determine whether the religious belief or practice is religious
rather than secular.40 Second, the court must determine whether the
33. Id. at 407. The cases cited by the Court in support of these criteria dealt with first
amendment guarantees other than the free exercise of religion. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
438 (1963) (free speech); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960) (freedom of association);
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (free speech); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945) (free speech); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144-49 (1943) (freedom of speech and
press); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (freedom of speech and press). See 374
U.S. at 403, 406, 407-08.
34. 374 U.S. at 399.
35. Id. at 410.
36. Id. at 404.
37. Id. at 406-09. The state suggested that a ruling in favor of Sherbert would encourage the
filing of fraudulent claims with a concomitant reduction in unemployment compensation funds
and would disrupt the schedules of employers who required Saturday work. Id. at 407.
38. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
39. Id. at 214-29, 234-36.
40. Id. at 215. The Supreme Court originally held that courts could not consider the validity
of a religious claim in free exercise cases. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944), in
which the Court said that "[freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is
basic in a society of free men. . . .It embraces the right to maintain theories of life and of death
and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of orthodox faiths." See also Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (state statute conditioning lawful solicitation of money for a
religious cause upon receipt of a permit issued by an official who determines whether the cause is
religious held invalid because such a religious test acted as censorship of religion).
Although admitting that the determination of what is a religious belief is "a most delicate ques-
tion," 406 U.S. at 215, the Yoder Court concluded that "the very concept of ordered liberty pre-
cludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as
a whole has important interests." Id. at 215-16.
The Yoder decision suggests that religious beliefs, to invoke constitutional protection, must
have an institutional quality. "It cannot be overemphasized that we are not dealing with a way of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/10
Number 1] FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
law or regulation burdens the free exercise of religion.4 Finally, the
court must balance this burden against the state's interest in upholding
the law at issue,42 the inconvenience a religious exemption would cause
to the state,43 and, if the state's interest is stronger, the availability of a
less restrictive alternative. 44
life and mode of education by a group claiming to have recently discovered some 'progressive' or
more enlightened process for rearing children for modem life." Id. at 235. See id. at 215-19. The
"institutional quality" requirement suggests that courts will grant claims of "conscience" less pro-
tection than claims by orthodox religions. Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education,
andthe First.4mendment'sReligion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 213, 238 (1973). For cases uphold-
ing claims of conscience, see Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Nevertheless, in Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the following crite-
ria to find that a sectarian school's policy of racial segregation was not based on a religious interest
entitled to free exercise protection:
Whether a belief is "religious" and thus deserving of some protection by the First
Amendment does not depend on whether the belief is true or false. Nor does it depend
on whether the belief is reprehensible to the majority of society. Instead, . . . the "reli-
gious" nature of a belief depends on (1) whether the belief is based on a theory "of man's
nature or his place in the Universe," (2) which is not merely a personal preference but
has an institutional quality about it, and (3) which is sincere.
Id. at 324 (citations omitted).
Recent cases have upheld the religious legitimacy of the holiday observances mandated by the
Church of God. See, e.g., Neiderhuber v. Camden County Vocational & Technical School Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 495 F. Supp. 273 (D.N.J. 1980) (dismissal of public school teacher for taking leave to
observe holy days of Church of God violated free exercise of religion); Edwards v. School Bd., 483
F. Supp. 620 (W.D. Va. 1980) (school board, in dismissing teacher's aid for taking leave of ab-
sence to observe Church of God holy days, violated Title VII requirement that employer accom-
modate employees' religious practices), vacated in part, 658 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981); Rankins v.
Commission on Professional Competence, 24 Cal. 3d 167, 593 P.2d 852, 154 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1979)
(dismissal of public school teacher for observing Church of God holy days violated first amend-
ment, Title VII, and California Constitution).
41. 406 U.S. at 218. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Bureau of Motor
Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1225, 1228 (Ind. 1978).
42. 406 U.S. at 221. See State ex rel Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 113 (Tenn. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976).
43. 406 U.S. at 221, 236. This interest is considered if the plaintiff seeks exemption from an
otherwise constitutional law. See, e.g., Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., 197 Colo. 455, 458, 593
P.2d 1363, 1365, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 137, 125 N.W.2d
588, 589 (1963).
44. 406 U.S. at 225. This requirement is applicable ifa plaintiff chalienges the constitutional-
ity of a law on free exercise grounds, rather than seeking an exemption from a valid law. See note
43 supra. Cases applying the "less restrictive alternative" requirement include Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., 197 Colo. 455, 458, 593 P.2d 1363, 1365,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc.,
380 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 1978); State ex rel Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 114 (Tenn. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976).
The "less restrictive alternative" test suggests a "strict scrutiny" approach akin to equal protec-
tion analysis. In Church of God, the classification of religion, rather than sports or sickness, see
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In Yoder members of the Old Order Amish religion and the Con-
servative Amish Mennonite Church violated Wisconsin's compulsory
school attendance law by refusing for religious reasons to allow their
children to attend public school after the eighth grade.4 5  The Court
applied the three-part balancing test4 6 and concluded that application
of Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law to the Amish in-
fringed the free exercise of their religion.47
Yoder represents the latest stage in the evolution of the free exercise
doctrine.48 The Yoder analysis emphasized the balancing of competing
interests over the Sherbert "compelling state interest" rule for analyz-
ing free exercise claims.49  Although the Yoder test broadened the
note 64 infra, for purposes of determining unexcused absences was "suspect." The classification is
particularly suspect because the policy has an impact upon a "fundamental" first amendment
right. The "strict scrutiny" approach requires judicial assessment of the existence of a "compel-
ling state interest" and a "least restrictive alternative" means to effect this interest. See generally
G. GUNTHER, supra note 27, at 670-71; Note, GeneralLaws, NeutralPrincples, andthe Free Exer-
cise Clause, 33 VAND. L. REv. 149, 153 n.30, 160 n.65 (1980).
45. The law required school attendance until age 16. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207
(1972).
46. Id. at 217. See notes 39-44 supra and accompanying text. In assessing the sincerity of
plaintiff's beliefs, the Court stated that "the values and programs of the modem secondary school
are in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion ...
406 U.S. at 217. The Court then determined the severity of the burden and stated that "enforce-
ment of the state's requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would
gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents' religious beliefs." Id. at 219.
The Court then found that the state's interest in compulsory education was de minimus in
comparison with the respondents' contrary interest in complying with the fundamental tenets of
their religion.
[Alecommodating the religious objections of the Amish by foregoing one, or at most
two, additional years of compulsory education will not impair the physical or mental
health of the child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to discharge the
duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract from the
welfare of society.
Id. at 234.
47. Id.
The Yoder decision is arguably the result of analysis based on the "less restrictive alternative"
principle. The Amish alternative of a productive, self-sufficient, and virtuous lifestyle could sat-
isfy the state's interests in preparing young people for self-reliant and intelligent participation in
politics and society without any burden on the Amish religion. See Note, supra note 44, at 160.
48. Several later cases have applied the Yoder test. See, e.g., Robinson v. Price, 615 F.2d
1097 (5th Cir. 1980); Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270 (C.D. Ill. 1979).
49. J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 878
(1978); Note, supra note 44, at 159, 164.
The major criticism of the Supreme Court's history of free exercise analysis is that the decisions
are ad hoc and unprincipled. The decisions present no objective criteria for the lower courts to
follow in order to reconcile conflicting state and religious interests. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 668 (1970) ("[t]he considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court de-
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scope of inquiry into the conflicting interests, the "compelling state in-
terest" standard survived as a significant element within the more ex-
haustive Yoder analysis." The Yoder analysis highlights the
fundamental conffict between the establishment and free exercise
clauses of the first amendment.-' The modem trend toward more so-
cial legislation reflects a growing legislative concern for the citizenry,
but it also affects their lives, including their religious lives, more
frequently. 2
rives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses
that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general princi-
ples"); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 53-56 (1966) (ad
hoc balancing test provides no guiding doctrine and thus leaves the courts to use their own judg-
ment); Clark, Guidelinesfor the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REv. 327, 329-30 (1969) (form-
lessness of ad hoc balancing test results in uncertainties for parties and courts); Kurland, supra
note 40, at 244 (Supreme Court has never established a doctrinal base for evaluating the religion
clauses); Marcus, supra note 2, at 1242 (balancing test is ad hoc because court must determine
whether or not a claimant's beliefs are religious and whether or not the state has interfered with
those beliefs); Note, supra note 44, at 150, 164-65 (divergent Supreme Court decisions based on
differing rationales indicate need for "neutral principles that could enhance both the predictability
and the acceptability of future free exercise decisions"). But see Giannella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part L The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 1381, 1384 (1967) (ad hoc judgment can be subjected to objective criteria). For examples
of proposed models for free exercise analysis, see Clark, supra; Note, supra note 44; Note, Reli-
gious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: .4 Model of CompetingAuthorities, 90 YALE L.J.
350 (1980).
50. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Robinson v. Price, 615 F.2d 1097, 1099
(5th Cir. 1980); Note, supra note 44, at 160.
51. See notes 9-14 supra and accompanying text.
52. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 721
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (increase in social welfare legislation exacerbates the tension
between free exercise and establishment clauses because such legislation touches the individual at
so many points in his life); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 461-62 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("[s]tate codes and the dictates of faith touch the same activities"); Galanter, supra
note 9, at 268 ("[florbearance toward religious scruples can be seen as a response to the problem of
reconciling personal liberty with increasing governmental activity"); Giannella, supra note 49, at
1389 (conflict between the religion clauses has emerged with expanded scope of government activ-
ity and the application of the first amendment provisions to the states and thus requires affirmative
accommodation of the clauses); Giannella, supra note 9, at 522-26 ("[tlhe importance of the princi-
ple of political neutrality increases with the expanding role of government").
In Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), the
Supreme Court held that Indiana's denial of unemployment compensation benefits to a Jehovah's
Witness who quit his job upon transfer to an armament manufacturing division violated his right
to free exercise of religion. Petitioner's religious beliefs prohibited his direct participation in the
production of weapons. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Rehnquist berated the Court for its overin-
dulgence of religious liberty. Id. at 722-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He asserted that the Court
unwisely required payment of unemployment compensation to an individual on the basis of his
Washington University Open Scholarship
270 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:261
In Church of God v. Amarillo Independent School District53 the dis-
trict court applied the balancing test developed in Braunfeld, Sherbert,
and Yoder54 and held that the school district's policy limiting excused
religious absences violated peitioners' right to the free exercise of
religion.
The court commenced by acknowledging that the first and four-
teeitth amendments protect religious practitioners from both direct and
indirect infringement of the pursuit of their religious beliefs.56 The
court first evaluated the sincerity of the plaintiffs' religious belief,57 rec-
ognizing that this determination was a "most delicate question.158 The
judge applied the definition of religious belief propounded in Brown v.
Dade Christian Schools, Inc. 59 and concluded that the observance of
the Church of God's holy days and Feast of Tabernacles constituted a
legitimate religious practice.6"
The court found that the burden imposed on plaintiffs' beliefs was
analogous to the burdens imposed in Sherbert and Neiderhuber v. Cam-
den County Vocational and Technical School District Board of Educa-
tion.61 The state's action forced the students to choose between
religious beliefs. He concluded that a judicial espousal of the restrictive "direct-indirect burden"
mode of free exercise analysis, see notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text, and an establishment
clause analysis restricted to striking down only intentional governmental assistance to religion
would allow the Court to ease the tension between the two clauses. Id. at 722-23, 726-27 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
In Thomas Justice Rehnquist also stated that incorporation of the first amendment guarantees
into the fourteenth amendment increased the instances of conflict between the two clauses. 450
U.S. at 721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Giannella, supra note 9, at 514.
53. 511 F. Supp. 613 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
54. Id. at 615.
55. Id. at 618.
56. Id. at 615. The court indicated that although the excused absence policy did not directly
outlaw the plaintiffs' practice of their religion, it nevertheless constituted an indirect burden on
their free exercise right within the meaning of Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 511 F.
Supp. at 615. See text accompanying notes 23-29 supra.
57. 511 F. Supp. at 616. See note 40 supra.
58. 511 F. Supp. at 616. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
59. 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1063 (1978). For the quotation of this
definition of religious belief from Brown, see note 40 supra.
60. 511 F. Supp. at 616. See Neiderhuber v. Camden County Vocational & Technical School
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 495 F. Supp. 273 (D.N.J. 1980); Edwards v. School Bd., 483 F. Supp. 620
(W.D. Va. 1980), vacated in part, 658 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981); Rankins v. Commission on Profes-
sional Competence, 24 Cal. 3d 167, 593 P.2d 852, 154 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1979). See also note 40
supra.
61. 495 F. Supp. 273 (D.N.J. 1980).
In Sherbert the plaintiff was forced to choose between abandoning a fundamental tenet of her
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incurring academic penalties for following the precepts of their religion
and abandoning one of the fundamental tenets of their religion62 by
attending school. The state urged that requiring regular school attend-
ance to allow students maximum academic development 63 and to avoid
overworking the teachers 64 was a compelling interest. The court was
not convinced, however, that the state's interest justified the burden on
the free exercise of religion.
65
Finally, the court denied that its decision, which forced teachers to
take affirmative action to accommodate plaintiffs' religious practice, vi-
olated the establishment clause.66 The court declared that upholding
plaintiffs' free exercise right against the school district's excused ab-
sence policy only reflected the government's neutral stance in recon-
ciling conflicting state and religious interests.67 The court failed to
articulate the exact reasons why its ruling did not compromise the gov-
ernment's secular role. Instead the court referred to Zorach v. Clau-
son,61 in which the Supreme Court upheld a school's "released time"
69
program against an establishment clause challenge. The court viewed
Zorach as authority for declaring that the state has a duty to respect
religion prohibiting Saturday work and keeping a job that required Saturday work. See notes 34-
36 supra and accompanying text. In Neiderhuber a schoolteacher was "compelled to forfeit his
position in order to follow his religious convictions." 495 F. Supp. at 278.
Neiderhuber points to modem cases that use constitutional principles in assessing free exercise
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. The Act provides that it is unlawful for
any employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an individual or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's... religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976). Further-
more, the employer is required "to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective
employee's religious observance or practice" if such accommodation would not work "undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." Id. § 2000e(j) (1976). See TWA, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 565 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1977);
Huston v. Local 93, Int'l Union, UAW, 559 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1977); Rankins v. Commission on
Professional Competence, 24 Cal. 3d 167, 593 P.2d 852, 154 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1979).
62. 511 F. Supp. at 616.
63. Id. at 617. "Yet even this paramount responsibility must yield when the application of a
law or regulation significantly burdens the free exercise of religion." Id. at 618.
64. Id. at 618. Because the teachers could accommodate students' absences for sickness and
sporting activities and no teachers had previously complained of an excessive workload, the court
held that the administrative burden to the state could not override plaintiffs' religious interest. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
69. The program was designed to allow students to leave public school before the end of the
day in order to attend religious school. 343 U.S. at 308.
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and accommodate the religious interests of its citizens. 70
The district court's routine application of the principles of constitu-
tional analysis set forth in Yoder and Sherbert reflects judicial reluc-
tance to address the problems highlighted by the history of free exercise
analysis. Although application of the balancing test does produce just
results, as exemplified by its application in Church of God, the test has
three major disadvantages.
First, the inherent ad hoc nature of the test precludes consistent ap-
plication of the balancing formula .7  Lower courts must rely on the
judges' own values in balancing competing state and religious inter-
ests.72 The values of the judiciary may represent those constituting a
consensus of American society,7 3 but without clearly delineated stan-
dards for evaluating free exercise claims,74 the ad hoc balancing test
leads to inconclusive and unreliable decisions.75
Second, the court required an institutional quality about plaintiffs'
religious beliefs to find that the accomodation requested served a legiti-
mate religious function.76 The court's decision to follow the Yoder di-
gression suggests that only plaintiffs whose beliefs satisfy this
institutional standard will have success in asserting claims of religious
discrimination 77 or in claims for religious exemption from valid laws.
71
Although claims based on principles of individual choice have suc-
70. Id. at 313-14.
71. See note 49 supra.
72. See T. EMERSON, supra note 49, at 54; Giannella, supra note 49, at 1385.
73. See Giannella, supra note 49, at 1385 (the Supreme Court "has followed a course that
ultimately intimates a judicial approval of established orthodox values"); Note, supra note 44, at
174 (the Court's decisions must not be the result of "temporary passion" or reasoning based on
other than the consensus of national thought).
74. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
75. See T. EMERSON, supra note 49, at 54-56 (using the ad hoc test, a court could reach either
conclusion in almost every case; as a result, neither government nor the individual has notice of
the rights essential to be protected); Note, supra note 49, at 356-57 (courts have not consistently
defined what constitutes a cognizable religious claim).
76. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972); Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc.,
556 F.2d 310, 324 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978). See also note 40 supra.
77. Cases addressing the discriminatory effect on free exercise by government action include
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Neiderhuber v.
Camden County Vocational & Technical School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 495 F. Supp. 273 (D.N.J.
1980).
78. Numerous cases have addressed claims for exemptions from valid laws. See, e.g., Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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ceeded in the past, particularly in the context of the military draft
laws, 79 rigid application of the institutional quality requirement may
cause the demise of future successful conscientious objections."0
Third, the court's decision exacerbates the tension8 ' between the es-
tablishment clause and the free exercise clause by forcing school dis-
tricts to take affirmative action8 2 to accommodate religious practice.
Although the court's decision is consistent with past Supreme Court
rulings, 3 it arguably violates the establishment clause prohibition
against advancing a particular religion.
8 4
Application of the Yoder balancing test produced just results in
Church of God, primarily because the state's interests were not as com-
pelling as those in Yoder."5 The court did not have to contend with a
difficult balancing process. Faced with a substantial burden on plain-
tiffs' right to free exercise of religion to achieve a state interest of lesser
importance, the court easily found in favor of the Church of God.
In evaluating a free exercise challenge to a school district's excused
absence policy, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas chose the safest path to decision by following a mechani-
cal balancing test formulated over twenty years of Supreme Court
analysis.8 6 Although the decision made little contribution to the consti-
79. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965).
80. See Kurland, supra note 40, at 244. But see Marcus, supra note 2, at 1230.
81. See notes 9-14 & 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
82. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
83. See cases cited at note 14 supra.
84. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 222 (1963); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
85. The school district's interest in requiring daily attendance is less compelling than a state's
interest in preventing a child's removal from school altogether. Although the Church of God has
an important interest in not allowing the undermining of a fundamental tenet of its religion, the
sanctity of an entire religious and secular community was jeopardized in Yoder.
86. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) is the origin of the modem balancing test. In its
-direct-indirect burden" analysis, the Court also needed to weigh the competing state and reli-
gious interests to assess the impact an exemption from the Sunday closing law would have on the
state as well as the burden upon the claimants' free exercise of religion. Id. at 607.
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tutional interpretation of the free exercise clause, it exemplified and
preserved the courts' overall commitment to religious liberty.87
RJS.
87. See cases cited at note 2 supra.
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